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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
aggrieved by a municipality is not to be denied; the usual reasons advanced for
any statute of limitations apply a fortiori to the need for a speedy notification
of claim against a municipality.
However, the decision may well be classed as sound legislative interpre-
tation resulting in unsound law. In the light of S 60 of the Civil Practice Act,
which saves to an infant a right of action during his infancy, S 50-e of the Gen-
eral Municipal Law, as interpreted, would appear to cause a result not favored
by the sound public policy of protecting infants.
Perhaps the Legislature will take the hint of the court when it said: "Wise
or unwise, fair or harsh, that law is binding on the courts as it is on the peti-
tioner." The Legislature should amend § 50-e as soon as possible for it would
be an anomaly to have an exception to § 60 of the Civil Practice Act where
public corporations are the defendants.
Burton B. Sarles
Edward ]. Schwendler, Jr.
UNFAIR COMPETITION - FAIR TRADE LAW HELD TO
PROHIBIT CASH REGISTER RECEIPT DISCOUNT PLAN
Plaintiff, a manufacturer and distributor of well-known drug products sold
under distinctive trade-marks, brought an action to enjoin defendants, fifteen
merchants, from continuing a merchandising plan, called a "Dividend Club."
Under the plan, cash register receipts were given on all purchases, whether of
fair-traded goods or not; these receipts were redeemable at 291o of their
amount in any merchandise of the member stores. Held (5-2): injunction
granted on the ground that the plan constitutes price-cutting and is within the
prohibition of the Fair-Trade Law. Bristol-Meyers Co. v.Picker, 302 N.Y. 61,
96 N. E. 2d 177 (1950).
Violations of the Fair-Trade Law are properly remedied by injunctive re-
lief, which will be granted without proof of actual damages if it is established
that there is good will to be protected, but injury to good will is ordinarily pre-
sumed if there is unlawful price-cutting. Guerlain v. Woolworth Co., 297 N. Y.
11, 74 N. E. 2d 217 (194.7); accord: Seagram Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum
Liquor Store, 166 Misc. 342, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 320 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Calvert Dis-
tillers Corp. v. Stockman, 26 F. Supp. 73 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). The validity of
the fair-trade statutes is predicated on the protection which they afford to the
manufacturer as the owner of the identified goods. Old Dearborn District Co.
v. Seagram Distiller Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936), followed in Bourlois Sales
Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N.Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937).
Other jurisdictions have refused relief in the instance of trading stamp
RECENT DECISIONS.
plans, indistinguishable from the "Dividend Club" in the instant case. For
example, the courts of Pennsylvania have held that such a plan constitutes
only "indirect" price-cutting and therefore does not come within the prohibition
of the Act; but that in any event, the maxim de minimis non curat lex is applic-
able. Bristod Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A. 2d 843 (1939).
The handling of the problem in California is especially interestingin view
of the fact that the New York statute ('§ 369-b of the General Business Law),is
modeled after the California Fair -Trade Act. There, such plans have been
held not to offend the Fair-Trade Act, on the rationale that they are merely an
advertising device to attract customers, analogous to the giving of free parking
space to those who make purchases; and further, that the giving of trading
stamps is a separate transaction which amounts to an award for the prior pay-
ment of cash.
The majority opinion in the principal case, refusing to follow the Cali-
fornia authorities, points out that the very practices outlawed by the Fair-Trade
Act where devices designed to advertise the seller and increase his volume of
sales. The court argued along the lines of rnius expressio: "It [the Legislature]
could well have provided for this exception as it has in others . .. It has not
done so..." 302 N.Y. at- , 96 N. E. 2d at 181. (For example, S 101-b(2)b
of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law allows a 1% discount for cash pay-
ment.) The court takes the position that the giving of any discount-no matter-
how small - constitutes price-cutting, and to allow the discount in this case
would "invite the flood" of cutthroat competition which the manufacturerb can
prevent under the Fair-Trade Act. See Shulman, The Fair-Trade Acts and the
Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L. J. 607.
In a spirited dissent, Judge Fuld conceded that cash register receipts did
amount to a "mathematical" reduction in the selling price, but that this was not
price-cutting in the conventional sense, claiming that the majority decision was
based on a strained construction of the Act. The dissenters reasoned that to
allow the instant practice to continue would not be the creation of a new ex-
ception to the statute, but would be rather a literal construction, requiring for
injunctive relief a wilful price-cutting likely to cause an assault on the manu-
facturer's good will. I
7-
The decision is ambiguous as to whether the onus of the plan lies in the
giving of the discount on fair-trade items only, or Wit' redeeming of the coupons
with such merchandise. In either case, the repercussions will disrupt long-
established business practices. If a merchant gives cash register receipts for
non-fair-traded items and redeems them with like goods, there is no question
of fair-trade, of course. The instant decision prevents the giving of a discount
on fair-traded items. As stated above, the questionable area is where receipts
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are given on non-fair-traded items redeemable with those that are fair-traded.
It does not seem tenable that the last-mentioned situation could be considered
within the purview of the statute. If discounts are given on merchandise which
is not fair-traded, and that is the only point at which a price reduction is
effected, the discount will have been completed and the transaction consum-
mated before fair-traded merchandise enters the picture, regardless of what
is thereafter done with receipts evidencing the transaction.
Mary K. Davey
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS - "THREAT" TO
PUBLIC ORDER HELD SUPERIOR TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Feiner, a Syracuse University student, speaking through a loud speaker
system from a box located near a street intersection in Syracuse, New York,
addressed a mixed crowd of whites and Negroes urging attendance at a speech
by 0. John Rogge that night in the Syracuse Hotel. In the course of his speech,
he made derogatory remarks about the President, other public officials and the
American Legion, and also indicated that Negroes did not have equal rights.
It was found by the trial judge that he then called upon them to rise up in
arms. This statement, although emphasized by the majority of the Supreme
Court, was disputed by other witnesses who swore that petitioner's statement
was that his listeners "could rise up and fight for their rights by going arm in
arm to the Hotel Syracuse, black and white alike .. ." In any event, one man
threatened that if the police "don't get that son of a bitch off, I will go over
and get him myself." Feiner was first asked, then told, finally commanded to
step down. All the time, he continued to urge attendance at the Rogge meeting.
He was arrested and charged with violation of § 722 of the New York Penal
Law-disorderly conduct. His conviction was upheld in the United States
Supreme Court by five of the justices in an opinion by Mr. Chief justice Vinson
on the ground that a clear danger of disorder.was threatened and hence the
preservation of peace and order on the streets was superior to defendant's
right of free speech. Mr. justice Frankfurter concurred in a separate opinion.
Mr. justice Black in his dissent took direct issue with this view, contending that
the police officer should have protected "petitioner's right to talk, even to the
extent of arresting the man who threatened to interfere." It was Black's con-
tention that the defendant had been sentenced for the expression of unpopular
views. justices Douglas and Minton concurred in a dissent on the ground that
the record showed merely an unsympathetic audience and the threat of one
man to interfere with the speaker. Feiner v. New York, - U. S. -, 71
S. Ct. 303 (1951).
There have been only a few cases wherein the social interests of public
order and freedom of speech have clashed. Outstanding have been Cantwell
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